Hikers encountering a fallen tree blocking a trail can climb over it, cut a path through it, or walk around it. In general, obstacles can be overcome, reduced, or avoided.
1 There is no section on using aftermarkets to avoid computational problems. If perfect aftermarkets were to exist, there would be no need for combinatorial auctions. With imperfect aftermarkets, bidders' values in the combinatorial auction should reflect the opportunities that do exist in these aftermarkets. Given the results of a combinatorial auction, even imperfect aftermarkets may present opportunities to mitigate the effects of misallocations in the auction. To the extent that this can happen, it can tip the balance in the combinatorial auction design tradeoff between efficient allocation and lower transaction costs towards lower transaction costs. Note also that aftermarkets can not only deal with misallocations caused by the auction design, but also by misallocations caused by changed circumstances and by bidder errors. 2 We refer the reader to Chapters 12-14 to learn more about variations of the winner determination problem.
Context
When designing an auction and dealing with computational complexity, an auction designer has to take into account the importance of various potentially desirable properties of an auction and, if necessary, make appropriate tradeoffs. Some of desirable properties are: 6 -allocative efficiency, i.e., maximizing the total value to the winners of the items being auctioned;
-revenue maximization (or payment minimization);
-low transaction costs and auction speed as both the bidders and the bid taker care
about their costs of participating in the auction;
-fairness, that is, concern about equal treatment of competitors (and the appearance of it);
-failure freeness, as failures should be minimized and their impact mitigated;
-scalability is important in design of auctions that will be used repeatedly.
An important concern in government auctions doesn't have to be one in commercial procurement auctions, and vice versa. For example, a government auction might have to pay special attention to allocative efficiency, while cost minimization could be a primary goal in corporate procurement; a government might not be in position to appear unfair or afford settling for a suboptimal allocation (as it could face lengthy lawsuits), while corporate auctions could aim at speeding up the auction procedure at the price of possibly 6 Following Pekeč and Rothkopf (2003) failing to find the optimal allocation. Regardless of the goals of the particular situations, some non-computational auction design approaches discussed in this chapter could reduce the complexity burden while preserving (most of) the other desirable properties.
Another concern to the auction designer is the potential informational burden.
One aspect of such a burden is mere handling information that could be massive given that there are up to 2 m -1 potential packages of m items that could be bid on. Clearly, eliciting bidder valuations for all possible packages (or all possible allocations) could be even more informationally demanding. 7 A different aspect of informational burden arises when the auction designer wants to or has to release comprehensive but aggregated information about the auction, such as the gap for all bids or minimum bid increments for all biddable combinations in every round of an iterative auction. 8 Therefore, auction design choices on the auction format, including the information flow from bidders to the bid-taker and vice versa could affect the implementability of the auction from the information management point of view. Some possibilities at the disposal of an auction designer are discussed in this chapter.
Mitigating Complexity Prior to Bid Submission
There are many tasks that need to be done before an auction begins. This section discusses how these tasks can mitigate computational complexity. The possibilities discussed below include the choice of definition of the items to be sold, the definition of a metric to make items comparable, and the definition of which combinations are to be biddable.
7 See Segal (Chapter 11). 8 In fact, as reported by Hoffman (2001) , the burden of calculating precisely the gap for all bids can be overwhelming in the context of the FCC combinatorial auction.
Sometimes the definition of an "item" is obvious. Often, however, there is considerable discretion involved in defining the items to be auctioned. There is little that can be said in general about the decision about how to divide assets for sale into lots. However, even though it depends upon the particulars of the situation, it is a critical auction design issue. There are some possibilities that are of potential value that are worth mentioning.
One of these is defining some sort of measure that can be used, perhaps with adjustments, to make items fungible. When this can be done, it greatly simplifies the computational problem of selecting winners. An example of this is daily electricity supply auctions. In the best of these, a megawatt of power injected into the electricity grid over a given hour at point A is equivalent to a megawatt injected into the grid that hour at point B except for an adjustment designed to take account appropriately of the costs of transmission congestion. This is called "Locational Marginal Pricing."
Electricity auctions that ignored this congestion effect and assumed that congestion-free zones could be predefined have run into difficulties. Recently, there has been a proposal to auction both energy and transmission rights simultaneously.
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Another one is to predefine biddable combinations in a way that reflects the underlying economics and will simultaneously mitigate potential computational difficulties during the course of an auction. For example, bids for take off and landing slots at an airport could be limited to pairs involving one landing slot and one take off slot. This would meet the economic need of airlines to take off any plane that they land at an airport while leading to a computationally tractable auction. 10 The next three subsections discuss these possibilities in more detail.
Defining items for sale
The issue of defining items for sale is not specific to combinatorial auctions. For example, what has to be sold and how should it be sold depends on physical nature of the items for sale, (dis)synergetic valuations that the bidders have over potential items that could result in either bundling or unbundling of such items, as well as on the practical considerations of conducting an auction in a timely and efficient manner. In many 9 For that proposal, see O'Neill et al. (2002) . For earlier discussions of alternative definitions of transmission rights see Hogan (1992) , Chao and Peck (1996) , Baldick and Kahn (1997) and Chao et al. (2000) . 10 See Rothkopf et al. (1998) . Also note that one of the first papers on combinatorial auctions, Rassenti et al. (1982) focuses on this potential application. See also Ball et al. (Chapter 20). situations, the basic physical units that cannot reasonably be further decomposed are clear. For example, well-running used cars should not normally be sold as used car parts.
However, there are many other important situations where such atoms do not exist such as radio frequencies, electricity contracts, and undeveloped land division. As for possible synergies and dissynergies, if these occur naturally or are common to all bidders, a good auction design will define auction items by appropriately bundling or unbundling in order to accommodate such situations. Thus, trying to bundle objects that are synergetic to every bidder into an auction item, and unbundling them into separate auction items when dissynergies are common, could be a general rule of thumb. However, one has to consider possible budget constraints and differences in individual bidder valuations since in such situations forced bundling might be inefficient and revenue deficient. 11 Similarly, even if bundling some objects is not synergetic, such "inefficient" bundling could make the total number of items to be auctioned small and the auction process fast and manageable. For example, an auctioneer selling off the property of a bankrupt restaurant might well chose to lump together into a single lot all of the pots and pans rather than sell them separately reasoning that any possible lost revenue will be more than offset by savings in transaction costs.
In general, bidders might not agree on synergies and dissynergies. Thus, perfect, noncontroversial bundling or unbundling in defining auction items might be difficult.
One approach to such situations would be for all bidders to agree on the items that should not be further decomposed, and then to allow bids on any combination of such items.
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This approach could be useful for defining items when there is no obvious physical description or limitation. The drawback is that bidders might have infinite number of objects they would consider buying 13 and, even in the finite case, the resulting number of items could be unmanageably huge. Thus, perfect, noncontroversial item definitions may not be possible or practical.
However items to be auctioned end up being defined, an auction designer has to decide whether to allow bids on combinations of items (provided that there is more than one item). As many chapters of this book discuss (e.g., Nisan Chapter 9, Segal Chapter 11, Lehmann et al. Chapter 12, and as briefly discussed in the introduction, combinatorial bidding could introduce complexities and potentially insurmountable obstacles in conducting an auction.
If many combinatorial bids are placed in an auction, this could mean (among other things) that bidders have serious conflicting synergetic valuations and/or that some items could have been bundled before being auctioned off. Taking this observation to the extreme, the final pricing and allocation, if done prior to the auction, could eliminate the need for the auction itself and lead to optimal posted prices since it would eliminate any interest for bidding except exactly for the winning bidders submitting the winning bids.
So, in addition to allocation and price discovery, combinatorial auctions are mechanisms for optimal bundling discovery. The process of discovering the optimal bundling of items is the one that differentiates combinatorial from non-combinatorial auctions, and 12 These items would be atoms of the algebra generated by the union of all objects (each object is a set) that any of the bidders might be interested in bidding on. For example, if each bidder provides a finite list of frequency ranges they would consider buying, one can define auction items to be all non-empty intersections of any collection of such frequency ranges (possibly from different bidders). 13 For example, a bidder could be interested in any 20MHz range in 600-700 MHz band.
the one that is responsible for inherent complexities of combinatorial auctions. Thus, to the extent possible, auction designers should aim toward understanding likely optimal bundles. This understanding could be more critical to the auction success than understanding likely auction prices and likely auction winners. In turn, this suggests that an auction designer should put an effort into properly defining auction items in order to manage implementation complexities of combinatorial bidding.
14 For example, consider an auction of three items a, b, c, with highest valuations (all from different bidders) as follows:
, and with second highest valuations being exactly one less (and placed by a completely different set of bidders). Then, by posting the following prices,
, the seller can bundle and allocate the items optimally by simple posted price mechanism, instead of running the combinatorial auction. Of course, this assumes that seller has guessed these prices correctly or that he has some information on optimal bundles and prices, i.e., the type of information that is usually discovered by the auction mechanism. Note that knowing high valuations without the knowledge of specific structure is not sufficient to find an optimal allocation; all two-item bundles are valued at 10 but the optimal pricing has to price-discriminate in order to clear the market in an optimal allocation that requires bundling a and b. Also note that, with the assumed high valuations, the seller could simply decide to accept only bundled bids on ab and bids on c, and not lose anything by limiting bidding in this way. Thus, discovering optimal bundling is valuable for marketmechanisms that allow combinatorial bids.
It is worth mentioning that even when packages can be divided among bidders, how this is done can have a major impact on the effectiveness of the auction. The original California day-ahead electricity auctions purchased 24 commodities, electricity in each of the hours of the next day. No bids on combinations of hours were allowed, and fractions of bids could be accepted. This is an awkward definition for a potential bidder with a generating plant that has start up costs, minimum run levels, and requires four hours to start or stop. A better design proposed by Elmaghraby and Oren (1999) would have bidders offering electricity from hour A to hour B. Note that the acceptance of a fraction of a bid in this auction would affect the allocation of start up costs but not the feasibility of starting and stopping the generating plant. An even better approach, actually used by the New York system operator and the operator of the PennsylvaniaNew-Jersey-Maryland system considers bids involving start up costs and minimum run levels, solves a mixed integer program to find the optimum feasible dispatch for the day, uses hourly market clearing prices based on variable costs and then further compensates bidders whose fixed costs would not be covered so that they will not lose money at the optimum dispatch.
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In summary, the way auction items are defined has direct impact on the level of complexities of a combinatorial auction. Even if items seem to be naturally defined, choosing to bundle or unbundle some of such items could significantly aid the process of optimal bundle discovery. Thus, if combinatorial bidding is to be allowed and if the computational complexity of running an auction is an issue, defining auction items 15 That such equilibrium market-clearing prices always exist to support the MIP solution is shown in O'Neill et al. (2004) . The rules for the day-ahead and real-time energy auctions (as well as those for other products, such as operating reserves) are in an almost constant state of refinement. For the latest rules in these electricity markets, see www.pjm.com and www.nyiso.com.
should be looked at as an opportunity to mitigate effectively the potential for encountering computational nightmares while running the auction. In fact, many iterative combinatorial auction proposals suggest use of some underlying measure to define minimum bid increments. 18 The use of an underlying measure can be exact or approximate. If it is exact, then the items are truly fungible, as 16 Suppose b(ab)=5 and b(bc)=7. While, in isolation, the bid on ab is smaller than the bid on bc, in the presence of other bids, say b(a)=2 and b(c)=5, one could argue that the bid on ab is "better" than bid on bc. 17 There is a substantial literature on this. See, for example Chao et al. (2000) , Baldick and Kahn (1997) , and especially O'Neill et al. (2002) . 18 For example, the RAD mechanism described in Kwasnica et al. (2004) and the FCC combinatorial auction mechanism (FCC, 2002 hold on the use of the residual rights, there will tend to be only one bidder for a given license's residual rights. The proposal is to take bids on many such licenses but sell only those getting the highest bid per MhzPop. Since spectrum of high frequencies is considerably less valuable per MhzPop than spectrum of lower frequencies that can penetrate buildings, the proposal is to auction low and high frequencies separately.
The key to introducing bidding units through an underlying measure on biddable combinations is that such measure is widely accepted and appropriate for the situation in hand as with KWhs adjusted for transmission congestion and MhzPops for spectrum with sufficiently similar frequencies and that everyone involved in the process, especially bidders and the auctioneer, is aware of the potential to reach a suboptimal outcome. In that sense, choice of the underlying measure that is aligned with bidders' values is critical 19 Some relevant theoretical analysis is Müller (Chapter 13).
for success of such approach. Thus, situations in which a measure that is acceptable to all bidders exists, are prime candidates for this approach.
Defining biddable combinations.
Allowing bids on prespecified combinations of items can mitigate the difficulty of the winner determination problem, as well as that of other potentially computationally intractable issues that have to be resolved during the course of a combinatorial auction.
Müller (Chapter 13) is devoted to structures of biddable combinations that ensure computational tractability for the winner determination problem. 20 Two things are worth noting. First, in most situations, it is not the size of the biddable combinations nor their number, but rather their structural properties (how they intersect, complement and supplement each other) that is the main determinant of the complexity of the winner determination problem. Second, most other computational problems in combinatorial auctions involve solving some sort of a winner determination problem, so focusing on complexity of the winner determination is of primary importance.
An important concern in limiting biddable combinations is that such limits could
give an unfair advantage to bidders who are able to express their synergies using biddable combinations over bidders whose synergies lie across combinations that are not biddable.
This again points out to the importance of properly defining auction items and of understanding bidders' synergies, as careful choices there could allow for restricting combinatorial bids in a way that won't be perceived as unduly limiting or unfair. Keep in mind that if computational complexity is an issue, there may be no set of usable rules that is completely neutral. In particular, allowing no combinations at all may greatly favor some bidders over others.
It is also worth noting that decisions on limiting biddable combinations interact strongly with decisions on defining items. It may be fairer and more efficient to have more items with bidding allowed on a limited but well chosen set of combinations than to lump the items into a few biddable "super-items" and allow bidding on any possible combination of these super-items.
Mitigating complexity during bid submission
One way for the bid taker to deal with the computational complexities of a combinatorial auction is to request that bidders submit bids together with information that will help in the computational process. Two specific ideas of this type are discussed in this section. One approach is to completely shift the computational burden from the auctioneer to the bidders. In the other, the auctioneer is completely responsible for computation but allows bidders to guide the process; in this way, a heuristic can find a suboptimal solution that is aligned with bidders' preferences that are expressed at the time of bid submission.
Relegating complexity to bidders
The auctioneer could choose to take a passive role and let bidders not only submit their bids, but also prove to the auctioneer that their bids ought to be winning ones. Some of the very first and successful combinatorial auction designs, such as AUSM (Banks et al., 1989) have this feature. Examples of such policies include standard auction designs that relegate computational burden to bidders such as AUSM and PAUSE (see Land et al., Chapter 6). The general idea here is that the auctioneer expects bidders to present a collection of (non-intersecting) bids that improves on the current best collection.
(Usually, the measure is the revenue for the auctioneer.) Thus, it is the bidders who have to solve the winner determination problem in such designs. There are variants of such procedures that might generate better auction results. Bidders could be allowed to submit bids without having to demonstrate that their bid could be combined with other bids into the best available collection of bids. In this way, even bidders without any computational abilities could participate in an auction. Then, the auctioneer (and perhaps other entities, e.g., those who have an interest in particular rivals not winning) could compute the best collection among available bids.
Relegating computational burden to the bidders is an option that does not really mitigate the computational complexities of combinatorial auctions, but it does relieve the auctioneer at the expense of participating bidders. The advantage of such a scheme is that the bidders know which combinations are of interest to them, while the auctioneer may be less well informed and have to be prepared to consider combinations that will not be bid. When designing such auction procedures, one has to be careful about the possible burden of managing in timely manner what may turn out to be massive amounts of information. Also, this approach assumes continuous bidding or multiple rounds of bidding as bidders have to be aware of all bids currently in the system when composing and submitting their proposals.
Bidder prioritization of combinations
Park and Rothkopf (2004) proposed a fundamentally different approach. They suggest that the bidders be allowed to bid on as many combinations of whatever kind they like but that they be required to prioritize their combinations. They propose that the bid-taker evaluate the bids, starting with no combinations, then including each bidder's top priority combination, then including each bidder's two top priority combinations, etc.
until either all combination have been included or the time for computation has expired.
This approach takes advantage of the bidders' knowledge of which combinations are important. It assures a measure of fairness when computational considerations do not allow all desired combinations to be considered, and it takes advantage of the fact that integer programming algorithms often perform much better in practice than worst-case based bounds. Note that the Park and Rothkopf approach need not be limited to giving equal number of allowable combinations to each bidder. It could be generalized to accommodate any prespecified construction of the lists of combinations to be considered based on the bidders' input preferences lists. For example, in an iterative auction, bidders who are more active could be favored by being allowed to have more combinations considered.
A potential concern with this method, as well as with any other limited search method (as discussed in section 16.4.1) is that bidders might have incentives to submit bids with a primary goal of complicating computational process in order to limit search and perhaps influence the final, possibly suboptimal, allocation that favors them.
Mitigating complexity prior to allocation decisions
Sandholm (Chapter 14) discussed methods that do not guarantee finding an optimal solution to the winner determination problem or do not guarantee finding it in a reasonable time-frame. The previous section discussed how the problem of solving the winner determination problem can be relegated to the bidders or how solving it could be guided based on bidder input. This section focuses on possibilities of mitigating complexities after bids are submitted.
Limited search
A simple general method to deal with the complexity of solving winner determination problem or any other complex problem during the course of an auction is for the bid-taker to announce (prior to the auction start) an upper bound in terms of computational time and/or other resources to be devoted to solving any particular problem. For example, in an iterative combinatorial auction, the time for solving the winner determination problem between two rounds could be limited, and the best available solution when the time expires could determine the provisional winners.
This approach is almost uniformly used in determining minimum bid increments in iterative combinatorial auctions. Instead of basing the increment value on the value of the gap (which would involve solving as many winner determination problems as there are biddable combinations), one could abandon any computational effort and prescribe a simple fixed increment amount (e.g., as in one of the first commercially implemented procurement combinatorial auctions; see Ledyard et al., 2002.) or could use the linear programming relaxation of the winner determination problem in order to provide an approximation.
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Resorting to a limited search option opens up several issues:
-Should bidders know the details of the algorithm used to solve the winner determination problem (or another problem) under time/resource constraint and should bidders be able to replicate the procedure used by the bid-taker?
-The very fact that a suboptimal solution could be selected potentially allows for a new gaming dimension. At least in theory, bidders might submit bids aimed at slowing the algorithm down and potentially bringing it to settle for a suboptimal 
1990)
There are several incentives issues that might complicate implementation of this approach. First, the auction-designer could try to set some incentives for computation contributors. Perhaps, the auctioneer could pay a fee to whoever finds the best solution to the winner determination problem by, e.g., awarding the party that first submits the best solution (hopefully, a provably optimal one) some combination of a fixed monetary award and a percentage of the improvement that the submitted solution made relative to the initial one. Second, as discussed above participants interested in winning items in the auction might have incentives to submit bids that are aimed at complicating computation, while at the same time having no chance to become winning bids.
Similarly, some concern might arise with respect to those interested in collecting computation fees.
In summary, limiting resources for computation surely brushes away potential computational disasters, but it does raise incentive issues.
Mitigating complexity after preliminary allocation decisions
A key goal of auctions is often fairness. Perfect efficiency, while desirable, is unlikely to be achieved in large, complicated combinatorial auctions. Indeed, efficiency may well be traded off against the transaction costs associated with conducting the auction. While perfect efficiency may be unattainable, good efficiency and fairness can be obtained even if it proves impossible to get a provably optimal solution to the winner determination problem. One way to do this is the "political" solution suggested in Rothkopf et al. (1998) . The essence of such a political solution to the winner determination problem is to give an opportunity to bidders (and, perhaps, other parties) to challenge and improve upon a proposed allocation before it is made final. Not only will providing such an opportunity for challenges provide an opportunity to improve the solution to the winner determination problem, it assures fairness. The essence of this is that it will be impossible for a bidder to challenge suboptimal auction results as unfair if the bidder himself has had a fair opportunity to suggest an improved solution. The reason simple auctions are deemed fair is that a bidder who had a fair opportunity to bid cannot credibly complain about the price received by a rival whom he failed to outbid.
Similarly, a bidder who has a fair opportunity to improve upon a proposed, but possibly suboptimal solution to the winner determination problem cannot credibly complain if, later, a better solution is found. Since he had a fair chance to find it, it was clearly too difficult to find in the time and with the optimization technology available.
It is worth noting that this "political" approach to solving the winner determination problem is likely to be highly effective. It can be thought of as a decomposition approach in which each bidder is assigned the task of finding a way to have some of his tentatively excluded bids included in the final allocation. If the values at stake matter, each of the bidders with tentatively excluded bids will be highly motivated. Bidders, of course, are free to retain optimization experts as auction consultants just as they now hire economists.
While allowing bidders the chance to improve upon a potentially suboptimal solution to the winner determination problem will assure fairness, it is not necessary to limit the parties who may suggest improvements to bidders. In particular, it may at times make sense for the bid taker to allow any party to suggest improvements. As discussed above, it could motivate such participation by offering whoever supplies the best solution a portion of the improvement in the objective function achieved. This can be thought of as an "economic" solution to the winner determination problem.
Conclusions
Combinatorial auction design, like many other design problems, is an art. Its practitioners must make choices that affect conflicting design objectives, and its results must be evaluated in the context of the facts of the particular situation. In this chapter,
we have attempted to describe a variety of ways that combinatorial auction designers can achieve good auction results when computational issues are potentially intractable. There are quite a few possibilities, and some of them have attractive features of potential use in important contexts.
The items that serve as the underlying atoms of the auction can (and need to) be defined artfully so as to make computation and other aspect of the auction workable.
Where bid takers have knowledge of bidders' preferences, and they normally will, this needs to be taken into account in defining the items. These preferences also need to be taken into account in deciding which combinations will be biddable, and the item definition decision and the biddable combination decision need to be made together.
When possible, one should take advantage of ways of making items fungible, either exactly or approximately.
If computation is a problem, its burden can be left with the auctioneer or shifted to the bidders during the course of the auction. If the auctioneer retains it, the bidders may be asked to prioritize bids on combinations so that if the computation cannot consider all of the combinations, it will have considered all of the most important ones. The auctioneer can outsource post-bidding computation to computational experts or to the bidders themselves. Further, the auctioneer can prevent potential problems that could arise from suboptimal allocations by allowing for challenges by third parties.
The combination of the possibilities discussed in this chapter with the computational capabilities discussed in many of the others will allow much better designs for combinatorial auctions in a wide variety of challenging contexts.
